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Ixsunexcn Co¡vsumnn CouNsEL's Corunnu
ExposrNc "ILLUSoRy" Unnrmnsunno Motonrst Covnnecr

¡v

httoúlction
Plaintiff 's counsel is Iikely familiar v¡ith the problem of "illusory''
UIM coverage. The client, who has
been severely infured by the negligence of an auto driver, presents in
the office terrified by the mounting
medical bills. Counsel is relieved to
fìnd that the tortfeasor has insurance,
and the client prudently purchased

Underinsuted Mototist coverage. The
Declarations page of the client's
separa;te UIM cover^
age limit for which the insured has

poJicy shov¡s

been paying a premium. However,
counsel's relief turns to ftustration
when he or she determines that, in
spite of counsel's best efforts, under
the terms of the UIM coverage or
endorsement, no UIM benefìt is go-

Pno¡'essox Cnnc Mu¡¡no

ing to be payable because the UIM
limit doesnt exceed the amount the
client will teceive from the tortfeasor
or tortfeasors. In another variation of
this scenario, the client presents with
$25,000 UIM coverage, and, under
the terms of the polic¡ counsel can
fìnd no situation in which any benefìt

would ever be payable!
The problem is caused by the
policy's definition of Undednsured
Motor Vehicle and, sometimes, by a
companion "reducing clause." For
ouf pufposes, there afe two very
different definitions of Underinsured
Motor Vehicle fhat are in wide use by
automobile insurance carriers in
Montana today. One, which I will call
the "narro#'1 definition most certainly produces an "illusory" cover-

tm

Register ûow for an intensive

age that is the subject of this article.
In the case of lIørdlt a. Pntgressíue

Sþecíølty Ins. Co.2 pending

at the

Montana Supreme Court, the insured
Hardy seeks to have the offending

illusory "nattow" UIM definition
declared invalid. MTI.A member,
I(ent Duckworth of Ronan has challenged the definition, and Randy
Bishop and I briefed the position of
Amicus MTLÂ on this issue as well
as the "stacking" issue presented in
this column last quarter. Both were
argued in II ørd.y on January 23, 2003.

TheUIMdefinítions
The "nattow" coverage UIM
definition is used by Progressive
Specialty fnsurance Company and
some other companies in Montana
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and defines án "underinsured motoras one whose tiability limits are

with a "reducing clause" which reduces any UIM benefìt by any BI
benefits paid the injured insured by
any tortfeasor. (Ihe "reducing
clause" problem will be discussed
later in this article.)

ist"

less than the

limits of the injured

insured's UIM coverage. For example,
Progressive's UIM coverage provides:

"Underinsured motor vehicle,,
means a land motor vehicle or
trailer of any rFpe to which a
bodily iniury liability bond or
policy applies at rhe time of
the accident, but the sum of

all applicable limits of liability
for bodily injury is less than
the coverage limit for Underinsured Motorist Coverage
shown on the Declarations page.

Other auto insurers use the
"I)toad"3 defìnition that defines UIM
as the difference between the

tortfeasor's limits
insured's

tort

of liability

and the

damages. For instance,

State Farm's policy provides:a

Underinsured Motor Vehicle _
means a land motor vehicle:
1.

The ovtnership, maintenance or use
of which is insured or bonded for
bodily injury liability at the time of
the accidenq and

2, whose limits of liability for bodily

injury liability:
a. are less than the amount

insured's

damages;

of the

or

b. have been reduced by payments
to pefsons other than the

insured to less than the amount
of the insured's damage.
The two defìnitions are profoundly different in their application.
The "broad" coverage definition is
insurance-consumer friendly and
provides a solid benefit whenever the
insured's damages exceed the BI
coverage availal¡le. The "narrow"
coverage definition used by Progressive and others provides an illusory
coverage often entirely defeated by its

own teÍms. That coverage defìnition
is made even \¡/orse when coupled
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Illustrating tlre problem
To best illusúate the illusory
nature

of the coverage

caused by the

flarrow definition, let us consider the
situation of the insured who has
purchased $25,000 UIM coverage
with the narrow defìnition. The fol_
lowing are five inescapable truths
about that situation:
First, regardless of the insured,s
UIM limit, if the tortfeasor has no
lìability insurance, it is a UM claim
and the UIM witl provide no benefìt.
Second, if by chance, an out-ofstate vehicle ddven in Montana had
BI limits less than 925,000, then that
vehicle is deemed an "uninsured
motor vehicle" under Ole son u,

.Førmers In)s. Group,s so thereis no
UIM benefit. Progressive,s policy
excludes "uninsured" vehicles from
UIM coverage. This is important
because some courts, while grasping
for straws to avoid finding the cover_
age "illusory" have held it could
conceivably provide UIM coverage
for out-of-state vehicles v¡ith BI timits lower than those required by the
state fìnancial responsibility act. See,
for example, the Indiana court,s decision tn Merídíøn Mut fns. Co. o.
Ricltie.6 However, there is no such
benefìt ro support rhe use of the
clause in Montana, since, under

Olcson, the UIM will not apply.
Third, if the insured has
$25,000 limits of UIM in Montana,
because Montana motorists are all
required to carry $25,000 mandatory
tiability limirs, there is no way ro

fecover, since by the ..narrow,, definition, there can be no

"underinsured motorist.,, (If you
object that we all know many Mon_
tanans don't carry insurance in spite

of

the law, remember:

If

they don,t,

they are uninsured motorists defeating any UIM benefits.)

Fourth, in fact, if the insured

has

purchased 925,000 UIM, regardless
of the limit of the tortfeasor,s BI
coverage or the extent of the insured,s
damages, there can be no UIM benefit payable under this "narrow,,

definition.

Fifth, regardless of rhe facr rhar
the Declarations page shows $25,000
UIM coverage, there is no way to
recover a single dollar of benefìts
under the narrow definition. The
insured has paid premiums for nothing.

Court Treatment of the,.Naffou¡,'

UIMDefinition
Consequently, some courts have
invalidated the narrow coverage UIM
definition. For insrance, while the
Montana Supreme Court has not yet
decided rhe issue, Judge Lovell, writing for the Federal District Court,
declared rhe narrow defìnition invalid

n Trans ømericø hts. Gttttþ a,
Osbornin 1986.7 There, the injured
Osborn obtained a stz¡te court
iudgment for fiL87,333.1.9 and secured
$125,000 in Bodily Injury liability
coverage from the car and driver that
hit him. Osborn personaþ carried
$50,000 UIM coverage that utilized
the narrow definition. Consequentl¡
Transamerica took the position that
the other vehicle v/as not an
underinsured motor vehicle.
Judge Lovell noted rhat the Declarations page of Osborn,s policy
showed 950,000 ìimits for UIM.
However, he noted:
The underinsured motorist
coverage will be triggered only
when the vehicle involved carries insurance of at least
$25,000 but less than g50,000.

In the final anaþsis, under no
set of circumstances v/ilI
Transamedca be liable for
more than $25,000 under the
underinsured motorist provisions of the policy.

Prcn29

Consequentl¡ he found the narrow definition of UIM void as
against public policy in Montana for
violating the reasonable expectations

less
and
$50,000 per accident.lo
equal to or gteater than but

expectations with regard to

than $25,000 per person

coverage.

UIM

In Bennetta. Støte Før-mMut,
Auto. fns. Co.,1a the court said:

purchased The coutt could not reconcile the
Montana citizens should have
Declarations page "which ostensibly
$50,000 of UIM coverage.
a reasonable expectation that
shows the limits of a separate
However, Magistrate Judge
when
motorist
coverage"
they purchase separate
Gen
underinsured
o.
Geì.co
,{.nderson, in Scbøntz
policies for underinsured moIns. øttd.Fa"rtnersAllìanceMut and the policy language and refused
torist coverage, they will
1zs.r8 recently revier¡¡ed the
teceive adequate comnarrow definition of an
pensation for losses
underinsured motor veThat COUft'S hOlding iS COnSiStent
of

the insured that he had

hicle and, applying
tract pdnciples without any
discussion of Montana
public polic¡ let it stand to
deny

fecognition of the insufenGe
cOnSUmef'S feAsgneble expectetiOnS
r - r_ _-- _ _¿ t^ ! rr¡r
-^:-^---^
fegetd to UIM covefage.
w¡th

UIM coverage to the

insured. As mentioned
eadieq the Montana Supreme Court, which is not
bound by the decisions in Osborn or

Scbøntzis facing the issue squarely
in the pending case of

llardy

u.

Prcgressfue.
In Minnesot a, in I:Ioe s ch en o.
S.C, Ins. Co.e the court had to apply
a

Nortlr Carohna UIM statute and

policy language both of which used
the narrow defìnition of UIM. The
insured's

UIM limit and the

tortfeasor's BI limit were each
$25,000. The coutt noted that, under
the applicable North Carohna statute
(as in Montana under Oleson),autos
insured with limits of less than
$25,000/$50,000 ate uninsured motor vehicles and could not qualify for
UIM. To be "underinsured," the
court found required that the policy
be at least $25,000/$50,000. The

coutt said in frustration:

It

seems to us perfectly clear

that although the declaration
sheet of Hoeschen's policy
states that it provides underinsured motorist coverage with

limits of $25,000 each person
and $50,000 each accident, it is
impossible for any motor vehicle
to fit the policy definition of an
underinsured motor vehicle: a
vehicle insured to liability limits
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insured motorist, up to

the aggregate 1imits

of

the policies they have
purchased.

The court's quoted
Bennett pro-

statement in

to resolve the conflict "to totally
eliminate underinsured motorist
coverage from the poLicy." Accordingl¡ the justices held that the UIM
defìnition "entitles its insured to
benefìts to the extent his damages
exceed the liability coverage of the
defendant, not exceeding the policy
limits of the insured's policy." In
esserìce, the court construed the illusory natro-ü/ coverage UIM to be
broad coverage UIM,11

In the Wisconsin case of
Iloglund.a. Securø. fns.,12 r},e
court held the narrow defìnition
rendered such UIM covetage illusory because there were no circumstances under which Hoglund could
recover the benefìts. In Hoglund, as
in many cases, the policy itself said
that a tortfeasor insured for a limit
less than the fìnancial responsibiliry
law's minimum was an uninsured
motorist so that, as in Montana,
even the driver with a $15,000 limit
of liability v¡ould not fìt the definition of UIM. The court held the
narrow definition is "inconsistent
with the insured's reasonable expectations."13 That court's holding is
consistent with the Montana Supreme Coutt's recognition of the
insurance consumer's reasonable

tected the insured's expectation of
receiving the benefit of multiple UIM
coverage limits through "stacking."
One would expect that the court
vzould protect the insured's expectation to teceive something more than
illusory coverage when a single UIM

policy is involved.

ln lønd.ís u. Am. fns. Exclt.,ls
anlndiana appellate court held in the
same minimum limits circumstances
that the narrow defìnition violated
"as a, rnatter of larv the public policy
interest which disfavors illusory covetage,"16 "Síhere an othefwise unambiguous insurance clause provides
only illusory coverâge when construed within the insurance contract
in its entirery the courts of this state
will enforce the provision so as to
give effect to the reasonable expecta-

tion of the insured."17 The coutt
ruled that, since the declarations page
of the Landis's insurance policy pro-

vided $25,000 limits

of UIM, it was

reasonable for the insuted to expect
the limit was available for his damages.,\s in lfoescben, the court
treated the narrow coverage provision
as though it was the broad coverage.
MCA 535-15-316 (1985) provides
that "Every insurance contract shall
be construed according to the entirety
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and conditions as set
forth in the policy..," just as the
Iønd.ís court did.
In invalidating the narrow cover-

UIM limits, regardless of their
amount, turn out to be equal to or
less than the BI Liability limits of the
tortfeasor. In fact, Progressive's nar-

UIM defìnition in another minimum limits case, the Supreme Cout
of Alabama, nSmòth a. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,18 said, "Not only can

row defìnition has been slightly modifìed from the ISO drafting so that the
insured's UIM limit is compared to
"all applicable limits of liability for
bodily injury" instead of "its limit of

of its terms

age

the insured recover nothing under
t h e se citcumstances, she
could recover nothing under any other set of facts."
The court found the nar-

row defìnition violative of
the basic insurance principle, saying:

Is not the very essefrce
of insurance the assumption on the part of
the insuter, for avalu-

ss

insured? ,{.sked another \¡/ay,
c n insutance policy legally
^î
provide "coverage" for which
the insuret can never be liable?
We think these questions are
self-answering. Surel¡ these
facts involve the application of
the "reasonable expectation"
doctrine.
Meeting the "reasonable expecta-

liability" (refering to the BI liability
limit on the underinsured motot
vehicle). Hence, in any case where all
other LiabiJity limits equal or exceed
the insured's UIM limit, the insured
receives no UIM benefìt regardless

of

his darnages.
This last class of frustrated
insureds is denied any benefìt fot
their UIM premiums, even if the
insured didn't personally recover the
amount of BI Liability covetage that
negated his or her UIM benefits.

Førmers Ins, Co,

Consequently,'at

dated that the insurer provide the
amount of UIM coverage shown on

of I døIt o a, Buffø,21 the court

In Gla.z ew s kö a. AIßt øte Ins.
Co.,20 the Illinois Âppellate Court
held that, under the nartow UIM
provision, the sale of minimum limits

of UIM in a state with the same
minimum mandatory liability limit
not only is the sale of "illusory"
coverage, but can be the basis for a
class action for fraud and for violation of the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act for all those who putchase the coYerage.

The narrow UIM coverage definition also provides illusory covetage
for the entire class of insureds whose

2a

the tortfeasor's

$5,000 each to injured husband and

wife co-occupants. Their $300,000
UIM coverage was held to be unavailable to them since, under the
natrow coverage definition, the
tortfeasor wasn't

tions" of the insured, the court man-

the declarat-ions page.lo

ðnger,

$300,000 BI liability limit was allocated $290,000 to a catastrophically
injured occupant of the auto and

The narÍow UltUl coverage definition
also proyides illusory coverage for ühe
entire class of insureds wlrose Uflll
lirnits, regardless of their Amount,
turn out to Þe equal to or less than the
Bt LiaÞility limits of the tortfeasor.

able considetation, of certain
risk of loss on the part of the

Prcn32

a. Me

held

that, where four injured vehicle occupants split the tortfeasor's single BI
Iiability limit of $100,000, the
$100,000 UIM limit on the car in
v¡hich they were riding was ruled
unavailable to them, since the
tottfeasot's vehicle was not
"underinsured" undet the narrow
coverage definition,22 Similad¡ in
Nøtionøíde Mut Ins. Co. a.
Scadcttr23 the tortfeasor had a BI
liability limit of $100,000 and the
insuted had four vehicles each insured for $100,000 UIM, and the
court held there was no UIM benefìt
under the narrov/ coverage definition.
In State Førtn Mut. Auto Ins. Co.

"undetinsured" tegardless
of their tiny recovedes. In
evefy case mentioned
above, the insured could
have recovered under the
"broa,d" coverage UIM
definition, if the insured's
damages exceeded the

tottfeasor's BI limits.
Insurers in Montana

rely on Stutzmnnu.
Søfeco Ins. Co. ofAm-,2s asavthority for their position that the nârrow
clause is vahd. Stutzmø.n, how ever, is
irrelevant to the validity of the clause.
,{.t issue in Stutztnønwas the validity
of a famlly exclusion to the "broad"
coverage UIM de{ìnition. The broad
coverage defìnition of UIM does not
result in illusory coverage. Stutztnøn
upheld a farnlly exclusion to broad
form UIM coverage against a claim
that it violated public policy. The
court found no public policy violation in the exclusion because it was
desþed to prevent insureds ftom
using cheaper UIM coverage as a
form of BI coverage.26
It is true that Stutzmøn søsd,
"[e]xpectations that are corattany to a
cleat exclusion from coverâge aÍe not
'objectively reasonable'." Citing
Wellcome, 257 Mont. At 359, 849
P.2datl94.There is no clear exclusion involved in this issue. Instead,

the insurer has created a sttuctural

policy ambiguity because the "nar-

row" coverage definition of UIM and
the reducing clause appear in complete conflict with the declaration

of a cettain dollar
of UIM limits. Carriets also

page's promise

amount

rcly on Am" Førní.ly

Mut Ins. Co. u.
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Lùuengoodr2? but, the issue there was
whether the household exclusion to
the liabiliw coveraEe violated oublic
policy. Review of the case shows no
relevance to the issue

of

Brøun2e In both cases, the court
afftmed that Montana public poìicy
supports UIM coverage where the
recovery from the tortfeasor is inadequate to provide the insured compensation for his or her injuries.
Finally, and most importantl¡
Bennett stands for the proposition
that "The public policy embodied in
these decisions is that an insurer may

not place in an insurance policy a
provision that defeats coverage fot
which the insurer has received valuable consider tlon."3o Consequentl¡
the courts should declare the use

of

the'inartow" defìnition of an
underinsured motorist in Montana as
invalid as against public polic¡ because it provides an illusory UIM

the

includes all sums paid under
Part A of this potcy.

clause.36

came grounds and applied the same

paid by the tortfeasot's insurance, The
threshold requirement for UIM coverage is that the tortfeasor has liatiility
insurance. Howevet, undet the reducing clause, that liabiJity insurance is
subtracted from the ]imit of UIM
coverage promised on the declantions page. Consequentl¡ irr 1989, in

remedy. Alsq in

the $Øisconsin case

of Wood.o, Am.

Fømíþ Mut. Ins.

Co.,33 the court
found the reducing clause rendered

the UIM coverage "illusory" because
the insurer "wi)). neuer pay the policy
limits of its UIM policies."
And, it doesn't m^tter that the
insured recovers some, but not all of
the UIM benefit. InVood.,the UIM
coverage limit was $100,000, and the
liability limit subtracred was $25,000,

Those public policies still

consin Supreme Court said
u.

vides as follows:
However, the limit of liability
shall be reduced by all sums
paid because of the "bodily

Pprc;n

34

age result caused by the reducing

age benefìts available by all amounts

coverage. As the Montana Supreme
Court said in Bennett, it is irrelevant
that UIM is not required by statute.

Ttre "Reducing Clause's" Role in
Rendering tlre UIM C-overage
"IllusorJr"
Insurance Services Office, Inc.
(ISO), the trade organizaaon for the
property/ c sualty insurers, in its form
PP 03 11 06 94,32 couples the narrow
UIM defìnition with a "reducing
clause" that is added into the "Limit
of Liability" provision for that coverage. With regard to the limits of UIM
coverage uuáilublr, that clause pro-

coveïage

Accordingl¡ Progressive's "reducing clause" reduces any UIM cover-

so that the insured netted $75,000 in
UIM benefits after the reduction.
However, because the insurer will
never have to p^y the frst $25,000 of
UIM coverage, the court held the
UIM coverage "illusory." As the NØis-

apply.31

UIM to a "broad"

definition to avoid the illusory coyer-

In the companion case of Køun
a.Ind.us. Fire&Cøs. fns. Co.37
decided the same day, the court held
the reducing clause invalid on the

the illusory

nature of the narrow UIM defìnition,
The Montana Supteme Court has
applied the doctrine of reasonable
expectations to consumers of UIM
covenge'tn Bennett ù, Støte Førtn
Mut Ins. Co.28 and Støte Førrn
Mut Auto. Ins. Co. a. Estøte of

injury" by or on behalf of
persons or organizaions that
may be legally responsible. This

n Kubn
Allstate Ins. Co.3a in 1993, the

"insured will receive some but never
all of the $50,000 coverage." Therefore, in Kubn too, the court held such
a reducing clause "renders the pur-

ported $50,000 coverage illusory and
contrary to public policy." Applyt"g
the teasonable expectations test, the
court asked, "Is it reasonable for the

insured, who is sold $50,000 limits of
underinsured motorist coverage, to
expect never to qualify for the stated
limits? We think not."35 The court's
remedy was to hold that the
tortfeasor's liability limit would be
subtracted from the insured's total
damases not from the limits of the

UIM coverage, in

essence changing

Cbrístensen

a.

Wøsøu fns. Co.,38 theMaryland
court said that to interpret UIM coverage to deduct the liabiJity limits
from the UIM limits means "thatthe
victim cannot recover part of the
underinsurance limit he has bought
and paid for, and that portion of the
limits also would be illusory."3e That
policy had no definition of UIM, but
the narrow defìnition offered by the
insurer as the correct interpretation
was what the court was rejecting.
(I note here that in 1995, Wisconsin enacted a statute expressly

permitting UIM reducing clauses.ao
Subsequently, Suk ølø u. II erÍt øge

Mut. Ins.

Co.al followed the legislative enactment and necessarih diverged from the rule of lloglund.,
Wood. Kultn, and l(øun The Wisconsin statute has no counterpart in
Montana, and those cases still contain
sound reasoning for treating negating
clauses in Montana.)
Incredibly, insurers defending the
narrow defìnition of UIM and its
companion reducing clause assert
that purchasers of $25,000 lirnits of
UIM only want to assure that they
have minimum limits of compensation available for their injuries and
that, if they receive that $25,000
from the BI coverage of the
tortfeasor, their expectation is satisfied. That argument is dead v/rong
and cannot withstand scrutiny. The

risk that a tortfeasor will only have
$25,000 minimum limits to compensate the injured insuted is the exact
risk u¡hich the insured wanted to
avoid. UIM coverage appeared on
the market in Montana shortly after
the state enacted the Mandatory
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Liability Protection Act. That Act
required that each motor vehicle be
covered by $25,000 BI coverage
thereby rendering UM coverages
(some with limits of up to $500,000)
inappJicable. Insureds reahzed what a
disaster it would be if they were
seriously injured by a motor vehicle
covered by minimum limits, and the
market for UIM coverage was born.
No insured would buy $25,000 UIM
unless he or she expected that they
v¡ould receive it if the tortfeasor only
had $25,000 in BI covetage.

not be reduced by amounts paid by
one legally liable if that would prevent the insured from being "made
whole." The sound public policy
underpinnings for the Made \X/hole
Doctrine set forth by this court in
Skøuge and DeTí.enne apply
equally as well to the reducing clause
in policies in Montana. If counsel
cannot convince the court to declare
the reducing clause invalid, he should
encourage courts in Montana to follow the Minnesota Supreme Coutt in
making the reducing clause subject to
the Made Whole Doctrine.

The "Reducing Clause" as
Subrogation Subiect to ttre "l.dade

Whole"Doctrine

If

one analyzes the "reducing
clause" it is clear that, in essence, it is
nothing but subtogation the insurer
awards itself before the insured even
recovers from the tortfeasor. If the
UIM insurer inserted a subrogation
clause in Montana, it would be subject to the "made-whole" doctrine,
and the insurer likely would rlot receive any subrogation benefit. Under,

Skøuge a. Mt Støtes TeI & TeL
Co.,a2 and DeTí.enne As soc. u.
Fa.rmcrs AnionMut, Ins. Co,,a3 the
Montana Supteme Court has decreed
that the carner doesn't get paid back
until the insuted has been made
whole including costs and attorney
fees. Because tort la\¡/ doesn't tequire
toftfeasors to pay attorney fees, even
when they lose in court, thefe is little
likelihood of insuret reimbursement
by subtogation. The insurer's answer
to the fairness of the made-whole
doctrine is to draft and insert in UIM
coverage the "reducing clause" which
essentially says if the insured recovers from the tortfeasor, we reduce the
money benefit we owe by the same
amount. Hence, the insurer receives
full subrogation without honoring the
made-whole rule.
In recognition of this reality, in

Iloescbenu.

S.C.

Ins. Co.,4the

Supreme Court of Minnesota applied
the principle that UIM coverage may

Pecn 36

The "Reducing Clause" as
Subiect to the "Comrnon Fund"
Doctrine
ln Mtntntøín We st Fønn Bureøu Mut, Ins. Co. u. Iføllas rhe
Montana Supreme Court recognized
the common fund doctrine. Thete, it
made a hospital vzhich sought to
satisfy its $309,000 medical lien
from the plaintiff's $530,000 tort
recovery pay its proportionate share
of the plaintiff's attorney fees and
costs.a6

The court identifìed the "common fund" doctrine as an equìtable
exception to the ,\merican rule that
party to a civil action is not entided
to attorney fees absent a specific
conftacrual or starutory ptovision
saying:

The "common fund" concept
provides that when p^tty
^

through active litigation creates, resefves or incteases a
fund, others sharing in the
fund must l¡ear a portion of
the litigation costs including
reasonable attotney fees. The
doctrine is employed to spread
the cost of litigation among all
benefìciaries so that the active
benefìciary is not forced to
bear the burden alone and the
"stranger" (i.e., passive) beneficiaries do not receive their
benefits at not cost to them-

a

selves,

Subsequendy, the court followed

Høll n Fþnn a. Stø,te Compens øtûon Ins. Fund.al where it made the
State Fund pay plaint-iff 's attorney
fees and costs when, puÍsuant to
statute, the fund reduced the

claimant's total permanent disability
benefìts by reason of his recovery of
Social Securitv disability benefits. The
court's test was whether there was
"an existing identifiable monetary
fund or benefìt in which an
ascertainable non-participatory beneftciary maintains an interest," The
court equated the insurer's reduction

with receiving a monetary benefit
from the claimant's recovered fund.
Fþnn should have an important
application to reducing clauses in
general.

Logicall¡

if

plaintiff's counsel

cannot defeat a reducing clause by
having it declared invalid or by having it declared a form of subrogation
subject to the made whole docffine,
then, using the law of IIøll and
Fþlnn, the insuter's benefit under the
reducing clause should be subject to
the common fund doctrine. Consequently, the carrier should pay its

proportionate share of plaintiff

's

contingent attorney fees and costs on
the amount of the reduction it enjoys.

C.ondusion
An auto insurer that uses the
"narÍow" UIM defìnition and couples
it with a "reducing clause" violates
public policy in Montana. The conflict between what the declarations
page promises and the UIM benefit
the policy will actually pay creates an
inherent ambiguity. The defìnition
and reducing clause violate the
consumer's expectations and defeat
the very purpose of UIM coverage
causing an injustice to the insured
who has been prudent enough to
putchase UIM coverage to guard
against the tortfeasor who carries

minimum limits. The minimum
$25,000 BI limit required in

Tnrer Tnn¡ms - Wnvrrn 2OO3

Montana's Mandatory Liability

mototists. .

Protection Act, MCA 561-6-301
and set forth in the Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act, MC,{
S61-6-103 et. seq., has never been

Eàdnotes

raised, and many believe it politically impossible to do so. Consequentl)! the prudent insureds try to
protect themselves by purchasing

limits of UIM only to fìnd that
theit coverage is in whole or in part
often illusory even though they
have dutifully paid a separate premium for the coverage.
This is a matter of injustice in
insurance contracting, and it is
unnecessary. High volume insurers
like State Farm use the consumer
friendly "broa.d" UIM definition
and temain competitive. Counsel
must persuade the courts in Montana. to invalidate the narrow definition and its companion-reducing
clause to end the sale of "illusory" UIM coverage to Montana
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